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WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
     In this labor relations case, the district court concluded that, in 
the 
absence of appropriate language in a collective bargaining agreement, an 
arbitration award in a grievance proceeding was not final.  We agree and 
will 
affirm.  
     Plaintiff, a long-time employee of Interstate Container Corporation, 
underwent heart bypass surgery in 1992 and collected benefits for several 
months, as provided by a collective bargaining agreement.  In January 
1993, 
his application for a disability pension was approved by the Paper 
Industry 
Union-Management Fund.  He also applied for and received disability 
insurance benefits from the Social Security Administration. 
     As a result of these developments, Interstate treated plaintiff as a 
retired 
employee and terminated his medical insurance as of January 19, 1993.  
When his physical condition improved, plaintiff applied for reinstatement 
of 
employment with Interstate.  When the Company denied his request, his 
union filed grievances on his behalf.  They were processed through the 
steps 
set out in the collective bargaining agreement and culminated in an 
arbitrator's decision favorable to Interstate.     
     Plaintiff subsequently brought a breach of contract suit in state 
court 
and Interstate removed the action to federal court.  The district judge 
granted 
partial summary judgment to Interstate, but held that on two breach of 
contract counts, the case would have to proceed because the grievance 
arbitration was not final and binding.  The district court then certified 
the 
issue as a controlling question of law under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and we 
granted leave to appeal.   
     Article VII of the collective bargaining agreement directs that 
"grievances shall be processed in the following manner" and lays out a 
four- 
step procedure beginning with the participation of a supervisor and 
working 
up through the plant manager and general manager.  Step 4 provides that if 
the dispute has not been settled at that point, the union can give the 
company 
"notice of its intention to submit the grievance to arbitration" and 
request the 
American Arbitration Association to supply a list of arbitrators.  The 
arbitrators' authority is limited to "interpreting and/or applying the 
language 
of the existing Labor Agreement"; they cannot "amend, modify, or alter in 
any manner whatsoever, any provision of the Agreement."  The words "final" 
or "binding" do not appear in Article VII. 
     The preface to the entire collective bargaining agreement includes 
the 
following statement:  "The terms herein stated are the exclusive terms for 
collective bargaining between the respective parties.  It is mutually 
agreed by 
the parties that all claims under prior contracts shall be considered null 
and 
void with the effective date of this Agreement."  
     The district court first noted the absence of such terms as "binding" 
or 
"final" in Article VII and then looked to the collective bargaining 
agreement 
in its entirety to determine whether the parties intended to preclude a 
suit 
under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
185(a).  Although the company relied on the preface to the collective 
bargaining agreement for its assertion that arbitration was exclusive and 
binding, the court disagreed, finding that the paragraph "does not compel 
the 
conclusion that the arbitration provision . . . is final and binding."  
Finally, 
the district judge pointed out that although "the grievance procedures are 
mandatory [that] does not necessarily mean they are final and binding."   
     Although the district court did not articulate the controlling 
question of 
law that it certified under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), from the briefs and 
arguments 
presented to us, we construe the question to be whether an arbitration 
award 
precludes review on the merits under section 301 when the collective 
bargaining agreement does not provide that arbitration is the final, 
binding, 
or exclusive means of resolving the dispute.  The answer to that question 
requires consideration of several cross-currents in labor law. 
                                I. 
     National labor policy favors access to a judicial forum to resolve 
labor 
disputes.  Section 301 provides that "suits for violations of contracts 
between 
an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district 
court 
of the United States."  29 U.S.C. § 185(a). 
     Although section 301 facially appears to be only a jurisdictional 
statute, it has been construed broadly to establish a cause of action as 
well.  
See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957).  
"Section 301 contemplates suits by and against individual employees as 
well 
as between unions and employers . . . § 301 suits encompass those seeking 
to 
vindicate `uniquely personal' rights of employees such as wages, hours, 
overtime pay, and wrongful discharge."  Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, 
Inc., 
424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 198- 
200 (1962). 
     In Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 173 (1990), the 
Supreme Court commented on the "strong federal policy favoring judicial 
enforcement of collective-bargaining agreements."  The Court observed that 
"there is a strong presumption that favors access to a neutral forum for 
the 
peaceful resolution of disputes."  Id.  In that case, the alternative to 
resolution 
of a grievance by a section 301 action was "economic warfare" between the 
parties.   In those circumstances, resort to the courts was preferable.   
     In Clayton v. International Union Automobile Workers, 451 U.S. 679 
(1981), the Court recognized the importance of following contractually- 
mandated grievance procedures.  Thus, before resorting to a section 301 
suit, 
an employee "must attempt to exhaust any exclusive grievance and 
arbitration procedures established by [a collective bargaining] 
agreement."  
Id. at 681.  The Court observed that it was important "to protect the 
integrity 
of the collective-bargaining process and to further that aspect of 
national 
labor policy that encourages private rather than judicial resolution of 
disputes 
arising over the interpretation and application of collective-bargaining 
agreements."  Id. at 687. 
     Yet another consideration enters into the picture.  In section 203(d) 
of 
the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d), Congress 
emphasized that:  "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties 
is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance 
disputes 
arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective- 
bargaining agreement."  Commenting on this admonition in United 
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 566 (1960), the Court 
noted that the policy "can be effectuated only if the means chosen by the 
parties for settlement of their differences under a collective bargaining 
agreement is given full play."  Consequently, courts "should not undertake 
to 
review the merits of arbitration awards but should defer to the tribunal 
chosen by the parties finally to settle their dispute."  Hines, 424 U.S. 
at 563. 
     Arbitration, however, is a question of contract and "a party cannot 
be 
required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so 
to 
submit."  United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 
574, 582 (1960).  Finally, where the contract contains an arbitration 
clause, 
there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that it should apply 
"unless 
it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not 
susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."  Id. 
at 582- 
83.  The question of the arbitrability of an issue is ordinarily for the 
court, but 
once arbitration is found to be applicable, the court should not address 
the 
merits of the grievance.   AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications 
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986).   
     From this brief review of these familiar cases in labor law, we 
derive 
the following policies.  Section 301 suits provide a judicial remedy for 
violations of a collective bargaining agreement.  Hines, 424 U.S. at 562.  
Exhaustion of collective bargaining grievance procedures is encouraged as 
a 
prerequisite to a section 301 suit.  Clayton, 451 U.S. at 681; Republic 
Steel 
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).   Collective bargaining 
agreement grievance provisions may give rise to a presumption of 
arbitrability.  AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 650.  If the parties agree 
that 
they may not institute civil suits and that the grievance procedures are 
final, 
those provisions will be enforced.  "[P]lenary review by a court of the 
merits 
would make meaningless the provisions that the arbitrator's decision is 
final."  United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 
593, 
599 (1960). 
                               II. 
     Reconciling these sometimes conflicting policies is the task 
presented 
in this case.  The parties do not dispute that the grievance is 
arbitrable, that 
arbitration is mandatory, and that it has resulted in an award.  The issue 
is 
whether the award is "final" in the sense that the courts may not 
rejudicate 
the grievance.  Preliminarily, we agree with the district court's view 
that the 
preface to the collective bargaining agreement does not govern the issue 
here.  
The quoted paragraph is simply a standard integration clause. 
     It is important to distinguish between terms sometimes used 
interchangeably in this field.  Arbitration may be mandatory in the sense 
that 
the parties are required to use that procedure.   Although appellate 
rulings 
have used the word "exclusive," they do not govern the issue of whether 
the 
arbitration awards are "final" in the sense that they preclude resort to a 
section 301 suit on the merits, but rather the opinions refer to the 
requirement 
that the grievance procedures be exhausted before filing suit.  See, e.g., 
Clayton, 451 U.S. at 681; Maddox, 379 U.S. at 652.  
     Extrapolating from the general principles, we conclude that because 
the 
court must determine the duty to arbitrate from an interpretation of the 
collective bargaining agreement, it also has the task of determining the 
dispositive effect to be given to an award -- again, by construing the 
contract.  
 Although a presumption in favor of arbitrability exists, that procedure 
may 
not be imposed upon the parties except by agreement.  A contract that is 
silent on the method of resolving grievances cannot be said to require 
arbitration, despite the policy that favors that procedure.  Warrior & 
Gulf 
Navigation, 363 U.S. at 582.     
     In this case, the employer argues that because the contract makes 
arbitration mandatory, it must necessarily be final as well.  That 
argument 
finds support in the policy favoring arbitration as a means of resolving 
disputes, but fails to meet the requirement of authorization by agreement 
of 
the parties.  It is one thing to say that the collective bargaining 
agreement 
may be liberally construed to give an expansive definition to the subject 
matter of arbitration, but quite another to interpret the contract to 
impose 
finality on all grievances.   
     Imposing finality deprives a party of the right to present the merits 
of 
an arbitration award for review by a court.  The opportunity to seek 
correction of an allegedly incorrect resolution of a grievance is a 
valuable 
right and not one to be denied cavalierly.  In that context, the 
presumption of 
arbitrability cannot bear the weight the employer attributes to it.  It 
cannot 
create finality in the arbitration process when the collective bargaining 
agreement is silent on the point.  In short, the lack of a provision for 
finality 
or exclusivity does not overcome the presumption of access to the courts 
for 
review on the merits. 
     Our ruling in this respect is consistent with the policy of 
recognizing 
the compulsory nature of arbitration required by collective bargaining 
agreements.  Mandatory arbitration prior to resort to a court is a 
different 
concept from mandatory arbitration precluding resort to a court.  We do 
not 
discourage, but continue to endorse, the submission of grievances to 
arbitration.  What we do decline to recognize is an expansive 
interpretation of 
the dispositive effect of arbitration when the collective bargaining 
agreement 
provides no basis for such a construction.    
     The parties have not cited any appellate cases directly on point, nor 
has 
our research uncovered any.  Although Groves speaks of the strong 
presumption in favor of access to a neutral forum, that case is not 
precisely 
applicable because the alternative was a strike, a course of action that 
the 
Court could not favor.  To the same effect, see Dickeson v. DAW Forest 
Prods. Co., 827 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1987) and Associated Gen. Contractors 
v. 
Illinois Conference of Teamsters, 486 F.2d 972 (7th Cir. 1973).   
     Interstate cites Communications Workers v. AT&T, 40 F.3d 426 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994) as supporting its position.  However, the issue in that case 
was 
whether arbitration was mandatory, not whether it was final.  The Court 
read 
the collective bargaining provision as requiring mandatory arbitration.  
Although the opinion said, in dictum, that the grievance procedure was 
final, 
it did not quote or cite the applicable language in the collective 
bargaining 
agreement.  That case, therefore, is unhelpful. 
     Interstate also refers to district court decisions allegedly 
demonstrating 
that courts will not allow parties to "relitigate" arbitrated claims, even 
in the 
absence of a "finality clause" in the collective bargaining agreement.  
Those 
cases do not help Interstate, but simply present examples of wording in 
collective bargaining agreements establishing finality -- language that is 
lacking here.  See, e.g, Sear v. Cadillac Auto Co., 501 F. Supp. 1350 (D. 
Mass. 1980) aff'd 654 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1981) (agreement contained finality 
clause); Frame v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 453 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Pa. 1978) 
(agreement provided that the specified grievance procedure was the 
"exclusive" method of resolving all disputes); Los Angeles Newspaper Guild 
v. Hearst Corp., 352 F. Supp. 1382 (C.D. Cal. 1973) aff'd 504 F.2d 636 
(9th 
Cir. 1974) (agreement stated that arbitrator's decision was "final").   
     We decline to consider an unpublished opinion of the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit, McInnes v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 53 F.3d 
331 (6th Cir. 1995) (table), also cited by Interstate.  That Court's rules 
make 
it clear that the opinion has no precedential value.  Moreover, even if we 
were to follow that case, we note that the Court did not analyze 
contractual 
language or the issue here, but rather accepted the district court's 
interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement without discussion.   
     Our decision in Cady v. Twin Rivers Towing Co., 486 F.2d 1335 (3d 
Cir. 1973) does not compel us to reach a different result.  In that case, 
a 
seaman, who declined to pursue his grievance through arbitration, sought 
damages in the district court under section 301.  We held that his suit 
was 
barred because he failed to complete the "binding grievance procedures" 
laid 
out in his collective bargaining agreement and failed to prove that his 
union  
had breached its duty of fair representation.  Id. at 1338-39. 
     Here, the parties rely solely on the wording of the contract for 
their 
positions, without any evidence of an established bargaining history or 
course of conduct to support their interpretations.  We do not rely solely 
on 
the absence of "talismanic" phrases, but we must give full credit to the 
language the parties have chosen to include -- or not include -- in their 
agreement.   
     Collective bargaining agreements almost invariably explain that 
arbitration proceedings will be "final," "binding," or "exclusive," or use 
other 
words to that effect.  This agreement was drafted by parties well-versed 
in  
labor matters and cognizant of that convention.  The omission of any 
indication that arbitration proceedings should be final and binding leads 
us to 
conclude that, if we nevertheless declared them to be so, we would not be 
enforcing the will of the parties, as expressed in their agreement. 
     As we stated in Communication Workers v. AT&T, 932 F.2d 199, 210 
(3d Cir. 1991), words such as "exclusive forum" support a finding that the 
parties intended to preclude judicial review.  Where the words "final," 
"binding," or "exclusive" fail to appear, and where the parties have not 
shown a history of giving dispositive effect to arbitration decisions, we 
cannot conclude that they intended to overcome the presumption favoring 
access to a judicial forum.  
     The order of the district court will be affirmed. 
